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Purpose: To unpack the shared understandings of safety held by workers on large UK construction 
sites using a complexity lens, and so provide empirical support for the inclusion of situational self-
organising within construction site safety management systems. 
Methodology: A social constructionist epistemology supports the discourse analysis of talk (semi-
structured interview and conversational), text (safety management systems and documentation) 
and visual (safety related signage) data collection from five large (+£20m) UK construction sites. 
Findings: Construction workers readily understand safety to be an emergent phenomenon with the 
complex system that is the construction site.  Contemporary safety management approaches 
struggle with this complexity, yet there is the potential to mobilise situational self-organising on sites 
to improve safety in practice. 
Research Limitations: Epistemological foundations mean no claim is made to generalisability as 
perceived by traditional positivistic parameters.  The data is limited to large (+£20m) UK construction 
sites, however underlying construction management systems are common to the industry as a 
whole and can find fit with practitioner experiences and other empirical academic work from both 
the UK and other countries. 
Practical Implications: Situational self-organising of safety management within the construction 
workforce is proposed as a key contribution to a relevant, dynamic and effective SMS. 
Originality/Value: Data is analysed from a social constructionist perspective and considered through 
a complexity lens.  This approach unpacks this data in an original way to seek synergy with existing 
adaptive safety approaches, specifically situational self-organising, and make recommendations for 
practice. 
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Introduction 
Construction safety has been improving in the developed world over the last few decades.  For 
example, the rate of fatal injury in the UK is currently less than a quarter of what it was in 2000/01 
and less than a fifth of what it was in 1990/91 (Health and Safety Executive, 2017).  However, there 
were still 38 fatal injuries to construction workers in UK during 2017/18, and it has been suggested 
that accident rates have now ‘plateaued’ (Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, 2018), and 
reached the level at which established approaches to safety management on sites are unable to 
support further improvements.  Whilst ‘simple’ accidents have been reduced, for example those 
now prevented by the inclusion of guards on plant and machinery, those accidents that remain are 
now more complicated; they can, for example, be a consequence of multiple work interfaces and 
workspace change, as undertaken within the wider context of production pressure. 
Consequently, the construction industry is now looking to alternative ways of managing safety.  
Here, we argue that, given the complex nature of the both the construction project and the practices 
and interactions that occur as a normal part of construction work, complexity-theory perspectives 
are an appropriate set of ideas to be drawn upon to support further improvements and initiatives.  
The study of failure within complex systems has supported the development of the concepts of High 
Reliability Organisations (HROs) (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and Adaptive Safety Management 
(Reiman et al., 2015), both of which, we believe, can bring new perspectives to safety management 
in practice, as well as the potential for application within the construction industry (Harvey et al., 
2016). 
Through a consideration of such approaches, and drawing on a substantial body of data gathered 
from large UK construction sites, we aim to give empirical support to the specific Adaptive Safety 
Management process of ‘situational self-organising’ (Reiman et al. 2015) and its potential to 
contribute to improved safety management within the construction site environment.  The process 
of situational self-organising enables workers to adjust and apply safety rules and work procedures 
according to the immediate work situation, and so self-organise their work in a safe manner (Reiman 
et al., 2015).  By unpacking the ways in which workers already make sense of safety on sites, and 
then re-contextualising their understandings of safety from complexity-theory perspectives, we are 
able to empirically reveal a space in which workers should readily able to find ‘fit’ with this process 
of situational self-organising.  Our objective is therefore to argue that the construction site is a 
receptive environment for the successful implementation of this process into existing safety 
management practices. 
Context 
Complexity and Construction 
Understandings of complex organisational systems have long been associated with safety, or more 
specifically with safety failures (Perrow, 1999).  Complexity influences safety in two distinct ways: 
through both social and technological complexity.  Social complexity is created through conflicting 
demands on work, for example the balance between production pressures and safety, and also 
through the necessary interactions of multiple organisations, as found within the construction trade 
supply chains.  Technological complexity can also result in safety implications as problem solving is 
often needed in practice to maintain production, for example during the translation from work as 
designed to work as done which in turn creates further, new social complexities that are situational 
and ever-changing. 
It has been suggested that complex systems, involving both social and technological complexity, 
have identifiable characteristics.  These have been used to argue for the existence of inevitable, 
‘normal accidents’ as part of complex technology, organisational or project processes (Perrow, 
1999).  Such characteristics include the existence of multiple interactions, either sequential, parallel 
or coupled, which in turn create cycles and feedback loops that are often non-linear and counter-
intuitive (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014:194; Bakhshi et al., 2016).  Non-linear interactions are those 
that cannot be predicted by system designers, and as such can remain undetected until they 
manifest, overlooked because they do not fit expectations about how the system should operate 
within its specific environment (Ivory and Alderman, 2005).  Consequently, when an accident does 
occur it can be totally unforeseen (Leveson, 2004).   
Complex systems are also tightly-coupled (Perrow, 1999), whereby a change in one element can 
have rapid and multiple effects on others (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014).  This can amalgamate, 
compound and magnify errors to the point of accident.  The contingent aspects of complex systems 
must also be acknowledged (Cilliers, 1998), alongside their often multi-nodal nature, characterised 
by multiple and distributed sites of control (Wynne, 1988), potentially leading to internal 
contradictions and tensions when necessary resources (e.g. time, money or equipment) must be 
allocated or shared (Perrow, 1999; Dekker, 2011).  Overall, complex system behaviours are 
emergent (Ivory and Alderman, 2005; Bakhshi et al., 2016) and are always to some extent 
unpredictable. As such, they can be highly challenging for the management of safety. 
Construction projects are generally accepted to be complex systems (Baccarini, 1996).  They contain 
high levels of social inter-organisational complexity (Milch and Laumann, 2016), due to their reliance 
on long supply chains.  This results in multiple companies involved in myriad work processes and 
increasing multi-nodality (Wynne, 1988), such as that stemming from the co-ordination, or 
attempted coordination, of different trades and subcontractors (Pinto et al., 2011).  Invariably, 
construction brings together organisations with greatly varying economic drivers and cultural norms 
of practice (Miozzo and Ivory, 2000).  Construction work tasks frequently involve multiple, 
technologically complex interactions that are tightly coupled.  These are carried out within the 
spatially-complex construction site environment that is in constant flux, resulting in non-linear 
interactions and unexpected consequences.  Indeed, change and unpredictability can actually be 
argued to be one of the few constants of the site context, as construction work demands spatial 
change for progress and ultimate completion (Sherratt, 2016).  Such operations also take place 
within a reality of internal contradictions and tensions, where resources can be scarce due to the 
reliance on low cost tendering and the resultant need for work to be carried out as quickly and 
cheaply as possible to return any profit for its participants (Sherratt, 2016). 
As such characteristics are themselves consequences of the social interactions and relationships 
between the components of a system, rather than the complexity of components themselves 
(Dekker et al., 2011), the behaviour of the construction site system cannot therefore be reduced to 
the sum of the behaviour of the constituent parts (Reiman et al., 2015).  However, the ways in which 
we seek to manage this complex system arguably does not reflect this: construction organisation 
and management focuses far more on technological project components than the social complexity 
of their interactions.  There is a continued reliance on Work Breakdown Structures (WBS) and 
subsequent Critical Path Analysis (CPA) for construction planning which are only able to 
acknowledge interrelationships in terms of sequence as associated with construction technology.  
They are unable to acknowledge the processes by which such technologies are made manifest by the 
workforce, and so how the relationships between these processes (rather than products) emerge in 
reality.  Within such approaches there is also often a lack of detail as well as scope for considerable 
variation in the socially complex processes of how work tasks are carried out in terms of method, 
materials, plant and labour. 
When considered from this perspective it is perhaps unsurprising that the construction industry has 
a disproportionately high rate of accidents worldwide (International Labour Organisation, 2018); 
they can simply be considered ‘normal’ given the complex nature of the system, which has 
significant repercussions for those seeking to improve and enhance safety management within this 
context. 
Complexity and Construction Safety Management 
The ways in which safety is managed on site frequently mirror the management processes that seek 
to plan and control the construction project as a whole.  Alongside the WBS and CPA for the project 
sit Risk Assessments and Method Statements (RAMS).  RAMs are often required by law, as they are 
in the UK (Health and Safety Executive, 2018), but also focus on specific work tasks: the components 
of the complex system.  This is partly by necessity, in order to avoid unmanageability in terms of the 
size and scope of the documentation, but again neglects the socially complex relationships between 
these tasks, many of which will be tightly coupled with multiple interactions.  Such relationships are 
difficult to explore or articulate within a bureaucratic management approach.  Indeed, despite its 
name, the ubiquitous Safety Management Systems (SMS) of many construction organisations also 
struggle to approach and address systemic aspects of construction safety (Sherratt, 2016).  Despite 
bringing together processes for management they are again limited by the simplistic 
conceptualisations of what they are trying to describe, unable to manage complexity in practice. 
Problems with the reconciliation of traditional safety management with complex systems have been 
duly acknowledged, and have led to the development of a number of approaches seeking solutions 
in practice.  The importance of taking a systems or complexity view of safety (Dekker et al., 2011) 
has led to a shift away from safety management through bureaucracy, including the ‘measurement’ 
of safety through KPIs, AFRs, and other lagging indicators (Dekker, 2014), regulation and root cause 
analysis of accidents, towards the conceptualisation of HROs (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and 
resilience engineering.  Such thinking also aligns to Hollnagel’s (2014) Safety II and the concept of 
Adaptive Safety (Borys et al., 2009; Reiman et al., 2015).  A key foundation of all these approaches 
rests on the notion that although many accidents can be attributed to human error, it is this very 
same human capability for adaption, innovation and creativity that enables complex systems to 
maintain reliable performance in the light of the challenges to they pose (Harvey et al., 2016). 
This necessitates a change in perspective for safety management. It suggests organisations should 
seek to support both organisational and individual capabilities to cope with unforeseen events 
within such contexts.  This develops resilience in the system, allowing production to operate in a 
robust yet flexible and, most importantly, safe way through a more pro-active approach (Hovden et 
al., 2010).  Contradictions between work as imagined and work as done (Hollnagel, 2014) should 
therefore be clearly acknowledged.  While such locally emergent variation to work as planned can 
also be considered ‘organisational drift’ (Reiman et al., 2015) and ‘routine violations’ (Reason, 1990), 
these are, nevertheless, essential ‘work-arounds’ through which the overall functioning of the 
system is maintained.  At the same time, it is when such adapted practices meet and become tightly 
coupled, that unexpected consequences that can readily lead to accidents can also occur (Reiman et 
al., 2015).  Thus, work practice is the space within which safety is both lost and achieved.  Critical to 
safe working is the bringing together of the often contradictory demands of safety and productivity 
in the context of a complex system that also presents that space with design and planning 
shortcomings, and a failure to always appreciate how work is or can be done in practice.  
With the acceptance that neither technologically nor socially complex systems work as predicted 
(Dekker, 2011), centralised control becomes problematic and localised responses become far more 
important.  An example of this can be seen in airline flight safety check-lists.  While airlines maintain 
their own operational checklists for the aircraft they fly, pilots also annotate and develop these from 
their own experiences.  In other words, the checklist as ‘handed-down’ by the airline and 
manufacturer is never perfect and in a constant state of repair.  This work feeds back into their own 
learning and practice, but also creates the potential to share better practices with colleagues and 
with the organisation itself (Gawande, 2010).  A process of organisational mindfulness (of which 
annotating checklists is an example) is one potential route to improving localised responses to 
experienced contradictions.  This allows for a mixture of order and situationally sensitive flexibility in 
management and work practices, and rejects the notion that there can be one set of rules able to 
find fit with all situations, by remaining cognisant of varying and complex situational contexts 
(Ramasesh and Browning, 2014).  In management terms, this also leads to a lowered proclivity to 
simplify interpretations of work systems or incidents therein (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Yet much of this ideology and the associated practices currently found in HROs and industries 
operating adaptive safety is very much at odds with contemporary site safety management 
practices.  The construction industry has not yet been brave enough to draw robustly on complexity 
theories to inform and influence not only safety management but also project organising.  For 
example, although the notion of ‘float’ is common in CPA, it is very different to the ‘organisational 
slack’ required to allow time for reflective decision making and continuous organisational learning as 
found within HROs (Ivory and Alderman, 2005).  Indeed, the accepted necessary provision of 
generalised uncommitted resources at the organisation’s disposal (Reiman et al., 2015) for adaptive 
safety practices to be effective would certainly make a site quantity surveyor quake.  Yet there are 
some aspects of adaptive safety that can be considered more suitable for adoption within the 
construction industry than others, one of which is situational self-organising. 
Resilience in the System: Situational Self-Organising 
On site there is a need to be able to respond quickly to changing circumstances (Harvey et al., 2016), 
and indeed worker autonomy, responsibility, creativity and initiative are all encouraged to resolve 
problems of technical complexity and ensure continued productivity.  There is therefore also the 
potential to harness this very same characteristic of the workforce, already found in abundance on 
sites, and apply it to safety management as considered from complexity and adaptive safety 
perspectives.   
To this end one of Reiman et al.’s (2015:85) ‘Principles of Adaptive Safety Management’ has been 
selected here for further consideration: that of Situational Self-Organising.  This selection is based on 
the theoretical potential for its application to construction work given the above, as well as the 
relative ease of its inclusion within contemporary construction SMSs.  Rather than argue for a total 
paradigm shift, it is felt that small, yet significant and appropriate changes have a greater potential 
for acceptance and implementation, and so success in practice. 
Self-organisation is an emergent property of complex systems (Bakhshi et al., 2016), demonstrable 
through the variation and adaption required to maintain normal work processes.  Situational self-
organising differs from routine violations in that it involves the deliberate creation of capacity for 
workers to self-organise in a safe manner, giving permission for them to adjust and interpret rules 
and procedures according to context (Reiman et al., 2015).  Instead of forcing rule-based control 
onto a complex system, this approach is therefore able to allow for the variance between work as 
imagined and work as done (Hollnagel, 2014).  This also provides a mechanism for adaption and 
learning as part of the organisations approach to safety management.  By supporting and creating 
new behaviours that increase beneficial interrelations and mindful comprehension, accidents can be 
avoided in the places in which they occur (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014).  This shifts the control of 
safety from a centralised command positon to one that is localised (Ivory and Alderman, 2005; 
Dekker, 2011), in which workers can respond locally to information presented to them (Dekker et al., 
2011) and make their own evaluations as to when ‘suitable’ becomes ‘unsuitable’ for safety 
(Townsend, 2013). 
Methodology 
In order to provide empirical illustration of our argument for the inclusion of situational self-
organisation within the safety management strategies of construction sites, relevant data collected 
from a wider study exploring construction site safety overall has been unpacked, revisited and 
presented here through a lens of complexity theory. 
This work mobilises social constructionism (Burr, 2003), an epistemological position which finds 
excellent fit with complexity-theory perspectives.  Grounded in a relativist ontology, social 
constructionism is able to accept and acknowledge flux in real world contexts, as reality is 
understood as socially constructed on an ongoing basis by individuals through their interactions, 
systems and practices (Gergen and Gergen, 2004).  There is no one, ‘true’ reality that can be 
determined through the research process, and instead different realities and understandings are 
revealed.  Such an approach has been demonstrably able to provide illumination and insight to 
safety management practices on construction sites, revealing the different ‘truths’ as found there in 
the social flux (see for example Sherratt et al 2018, Sherratt et al 2015 and Sherratt 2013).  Such a 
methodological approach inevitably challenges traditional positivistic conceptions such as validity, 
which is instead replaced by credibility (Lincoln and Guba 1985) as demonstrated through coherence 
within the methods used and argument as explicated (Taylor 2001).  Reliability must also be judged 
by different parameters and is demonstrated through standardisation in the data collection, 
transcription, and constant comparison during the analytical process (Gibbs 2007).  Therefore no 
claim is made to generalisability, and instead the aim is to find ‘fit’ and resonance with those who 
experience such places and present the variety and flux in the realities found there. 
Analysis of the data is therefore able to reveal the ways in which shared understandings of the world 
are created within this specific context, and such understandings are identifiable through the use of 
discourses (Potter and Hepburn, 2008).  Discourses represent ‘language in use’ and can be found in 
talk and text, shared practices and other interactions (Potter and Wetherell, 1992).  Discourse 
analysis looks to unpack such interactions and reveal how they position, prioritise and make sense of 
certain phenomena within specific social contexts, able to provide understandings and explanations 
of the world as manifested through linguistic exchange. 
Data referenced in this paper was collected from seven UK construction projects, operated by all 
located in the north west of England and all of a value of over £20m.  Throughout the data collection 
period, the author was working full-time as a professional construction manager for a large main 
contractor, and so was able to access data on her own sites, as well as visit other sites for data 
collection purposes with access gained through her professional network.  Data of three distinct 
types was collected.  Talk data was collected through semi-structured interviews as well as informal 
conversations with workers and supervisors held out on the site, text data was collected in the form 
of documents from safety management systems, and visual data was collected in the form of safety 
related signage and posters.  A total of 240 separate pieces of data (one piece being one 
conversation transcript or one document) were collected or generated for the study, and stored 
within a NVIVO database.  The talk data from both interviews and conversations was digitally 
recorded and transcribed using the Jefferson system (2004) and the transcripts uploaded into NVivo, 
in total 21 operatives, 13 site foremen/supervisors and 3 managers participated in the research.  
Documentary data was scanned and uploaded as image files, and the signage was captured using 
photographs which were then uploaded.  This data set therefore contained both contrived and 
naturally-occurring data (Potter and Wetherall 1992).  The talk data can be defined as contrived, as it 
would not have been produced and captured without the initiation of the research, whilst the 
documents and signage are naturally occurring data, not created for the purposes of the research 
itself, and therefore able to add to the ecological validity of the findings overall. 
The process of discourse analysis is interpretive (Wetherell et al., 2001), and the stored data was 
repeatedly coded within NVIVO, and the software used to seek out patterns (Taylor, 2001) including 
variability in both consistency and inconsistency within the data, as well a function, construction and 
representations of the language in use (Potter and Wetherell, 1992).  As with traditional approaches 
to discourse analysis, no pre-determined literature-defined framework was used, instead the 
findings that emerged were driven by the data itself and the immersion of the researcher in the 
data.  The emic perspective of the researcher as a construction manager was able to provide a level 
of construct and internal validity within the empirical work, and enabled the initial development of 
codes that resonated with the experiences of being on the site and working in this environment.  For 
example the simple association of safety with work practices was an early code.  A  constant 
comparison process (Silverman, 2001) was used, which practically meant that the data analysis 
process ran concurrently with the data collection process.  As new data was gathered, it was 
compared to the coded data, and patterns of similarity and difference highlighted, and the new data 
coded accordingly.  This meant that at times codes developed and generated new sub-codes, whilst 
at other times codes were subsumed by other codes, or developed into new more inclusive codes 
that were more representative of the data as a whole.  For example, the initial code of safety and 
work developed into two more robust codes: ‘safety vs work’ and ‘work vs safety’, better able to 
describe the relationships between these two elements as they emerged from the data .  The data 
was visited in a number of cycles, as it was compared to itself and the wider analysis in an ongoing 
process throughout the data collection period.  Ultimately, the most prominent codes, and therefore 
dominant discourses, emerged to the fore.  Triangulation both within and between the different 
data sources also formed an inherent part of the coding and analytical process, able to reinforce or 
challenge these discourses as they developed, and reveal the different ‘voices’ of the data sources, 
as dictated by their creation.   
Credibility of the work was reinforced by a process of member checking (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
with industry safety representatives at key stages in the process and on completion.  These 
representatives were asked their opinions on the findings, either through reports or presentations 
made at company offices.  Through this process, the findings of the study were confirmed as 
representative of the experiences and realities of those who work every day on construction sites. 
Discursive work is usually presented in such a way as to allow readers to assess the interpretations 
made during the analytical process itself (Wetherell and Potter, 1992), however due to the inevitable 
constraints of space within  journal papers, unpacking of the data has here been limited to 
illustrative examples.  These examples are used merely to facilitate understanding of the dominant 
discourses around safety that emerged from the coding and analysis of the data as found within the 
site context.  The overall aim of the wider project was simply ‘to explore the social constructions of 
safety on large UK construction sites’, and here relevant data relating to worker understandings of 
safety in practice, and so how it is practiced, have been drawn upon.  By examining the dominant 
discourses of construction site safety from a complexity perspective, and re-examining it through the 
lens of the complexity literature presented here, these many different discourses are able to reveal 
the realities of work as done, the associated understandings of safety in practice, and the potential 
for situational self-organising to find fit within the construction site environment. 
Findings 
What is Construction Site Safety? 
The data revealed that there is no one, coherent, accepted understanding of what safety is on 
construction sites.  A number of discourses were identified within the data that variously considered 
safety from the perspectives of danger and the moment of unsafety, safety as a practice in and of 
itself, as well as bound up as an inherent part of construction work, safety as either fluid and flexible 
or polarised into the categorisations of safe/unsafe, and safety as managed through methods of 
enforcement or engagement.  This discursive variation and the relationships both between the 
discourses themselves and with wider industry practices arguably demonstrate complexity in 
practice, and a complexity that surrounds safety within the construction site context. 
Indeed, broad understandings of construction site safety, as revealed through the discourse analysis, 
reveal a place of resignation around safety, and an acceptance of danger within construction work as 
a whole.  Safety was belittled, perhaps necessarily for individual resilience, as one worker said:  
‘I nearly lost my foot a few weeks back, you know…’ 
Construction workers know their work can be dangerous, and they know that their understandings 
of safety do not always find fit with contemporary safety management practice.  Indeed, evidence of 
the bureaucratisation of safety is easily found, as one worker noted: 
‘it just stops the jobs half the time … some of the stuff gets too carried away really … it’s just 
common sense some of the time’ 
This discourse of ‘safety vs work’ was common in the data, safety, or rather safety as currently 
practiced, was frequently positioned as a direct hindrance to the dominant drivers of production.  
Such understandings are a direct challenge to any worker engagement, and instead disassociate 
safety from work practice, setting it apart from any personal responsibility, ownership or action by 
the individual concerned.  This discourse was countered by the discourse of ‘work vs safety’, in 
which the practices of construction work were themselves positioned as a negative influence on 
safety, as one supervisor succinctly noted: 
‘It all comes down to earning money, doesn’t it?’ 
And when workers are on price work or feeling the pressure of time and money created by lowest 
cost tendering or the squeezing of profits down a supply chain, it is perhaps unsurprising that such a 
discourse is readily found and accepted within the construction site environment.  Indeed, workers 
rarely considered the negative effects of safety on practice outside of a context of production 
pressures. 
That this reality looms large within the shared understandings of safety on site can be seen by the 
resignation that accidents will happen.  For example, the current positioning of zero by contractors 
as a construction accident target has been highly problematic, as workers struggle to reconcile their 
lived experiences with such ambition (Sherratt, 2014).  Indeed, workers have developed their own 
shared understandings in response to this challenge of zero, as one supervisor said: 
‘…cause, nobody’s perfect … and as with anything there are always going to be accidents’ 
Such resignation finds resonance with the practicalities of a work place in which resources are 
limited, and time, money and production tend to be prioritised above all else.  Such understandings 
represent a shared acceptance amongst the site workers that the construction site is itself a 
something of a ‘complex mess’, a place where technical and social complexity create a space in 
which accidents are indeed normal and will inevitably occur. 
A Little Bit Unsafe 
A dominant discourse able to find considerable resonance with the principles of HROs and Adaptive 
Safety is that of ‘the state of safety’, a reference to the different shared understandings of safety 
found within the site environment that could take on one of two distinct forms; safety as solid and 
polarised, and safety as far more nebulous and changeable (Sherratt, 2016). 
Safety in its metaphorical ‘solid’ state was binary, constructed simply as either safe or unsafe.  This 
black/white assessment was most frequently found within the text-based data sources, drawing on 
the lexicon as prescribed by legislation and SMS practices in which something can ever only be either 
safe or unsafe, and there is no in-between.  For example, the UK’s Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 
1974 simply states in Cl 2(2) d that employers must ensure the place of work, i.e. the site, has: 
 ‘Provision and maintenance of means of access to and egress from it that are safe’ 
This state of safety supports and perpetuates the bureaucratic approach to safety management 
found on sites, in which rules, RAMS, checklists and inspections all look to make such safe/unsafe 
judgements about the construction site space and are readily able to meet quantifiable criteria that 
allow safety to be benchmarked and measured: work as imagined is always planned to be safe.  This 
approach also supports and enables a continued focus on the components of the construction site 
system, as demonstrated here by a tangible ‘something’ that is ‘unsafe’, rather than the more 
complex and arguably unmeasurable relationships between them. 
However, a reality of safe/unsafe was not that as experienced by those who worked on the sites.  
This ‘solid state’ of safety was directly challenged by the opposing aspect of this discourse in which 
safety was far more fluid and unsettled, and it was this construction of safety that workers drew on 
when considering their everyday practices.  Safety was constructed as variable, highly dependent on 
the changing circumstances of the context in which it was operating.  Safety or un-safety could 
develop at any time and in any space, and was constructed through shades of grey in contrast to the 
black/white representations of polarisation.  For example, a site worker noted: 
‘If you can get away with doing something slightly unsafe, but you get the job done…’ 
Here, safety is not a case of safe or unsafe, and for this worker their lived experiences instead 
contains many shades of grey, and things can be just a little bit unsafe.  This discourse of safety as 
fluid was very closely associated with site practice and the accepted realities of site life, suggesting 
that understandings of safety are reflecting the variability of its context, fully accepting and 
developing alongside inherent changes in the site environment.  The unique construction site 
context can be a very different place to any other; for example, a barrier around an excavation in the 
ground may be safe one day and unsafe the next; changes in ground conditions, the weather, the 
excavation process, all of these contribute to an ever-changing place of work, very different from 
other industry contexts.  Understandings of such change were also clearly acknowledged within a 
site-produced induction booklet which noted: 
‘stop working if unsafe or unhealthy conditions develop and inform your supervisor 
immediately…’ 
It is perhaps unsurprising that safety is constructed as fluid by those who work, and indeed manage, 
within such environments.  A further example from the documentary data, from a site induction 
presentation that had been created by the on-site team, sought to make the site the: 
‘safest site it can possibly be’. 
This allowed safety to be fluid and flexible, although not necessarily lacking in rigour, reflective of 
the specific site conditions at a specific point in time, more reflective of the experiences of those 
giving the induction as well as those receiving it. 
To a large extent, the discourse of the state of safety is dictated to by legislation, legalese and the 
desire for measurement through binary evaluations (Sherratt, 2016), which in turn perpetuate a 
reliance on the traditional and bureaucratic approaches to safety management.  However, this 
struggles within the complex system of the construction site, where change and fluidity are 
inevitable and the relationships between the tightly-coupled components form critical factors in the 
emergence of a ‘continuum of safety’ in practice. 
Managing Safety on Site 
The challenges of safety management within the contemporary site environment were clearly 
evidenced by the data.  Two of the most prominent discourses of safety, identifiable in some way 
within nearly all the data sources, were found to be ‘safety as enforcement’ and ‘safety as 
engagement’ (please see Sherratt et al., 2013 for a much more detailed unpacking of these specific 
discourses), both of which were closely associated with a formal, centralised and hierarchical control 
of safety on the sites, and their mobilisation supported a considerable expenditure of efforts 
towards ensuring everyone followed the safety rules.  From the site inductions, to the SMS, to 
formal signage, the voice of site management seeking compliance was found throughout the data.  
The corporate main contractor’s voice mobilised a discourse of engagement, as professional posters 
on the hoardings encouraged workers to: 
‘choose to work safely’ and ‘not to jump barriers’ 
Whilst the voice of the contractor’s site supervisors spoke much more abruptly, through handwritten 
signs and the discourse of enforcement as they threatened: 
‘disciplinary action’ for any ‘breach of safety rules, e.g. misuse or lack of PPE’ or for those 
‘found moving barriers or walkways.’ 
These two sources  highlight discourses that reflected different facets of the contemporary approach 
to construction safety management on large sites in the UK. Although the corporate voice of the 
posters is seeking engagement in a way that could reflect a sharing of decision-making and 
localisation of safety control, the site-based voice suggests this is not an approach the realities of the 
site are, as yet, able to work with.  The site rules, and their enforcement, clearly remain.  The 
presence of two such distinct yet closely associated discourses supports understandings of the 
construction site as a complex place.  Neither discourse is able to dominate, and so both endure.  
Engagement alone within the current site context is unable to have the desired effect and therefore, 
as suggested by Harvey et al. (2016), enforcement is still required to ensure safety is given due 
attention. 
Yet the very presence of the discourse of enforcement and the need for punishment suggests a 
reality in which following the rules is something of a struggle, a potential consequence of a 
dissonance between work as imagined and work as it is actually done (Hollnagel, 2014) and a 
continued reliance on a centralised one-size-fits-all rule-based approach to safety management 
(Ramasesh and Browning, 2014).  Indeed, as the talk data revealed, construction site rules are 
certainly considered to be ‘bendable’, as one supervisor noted: 
 ‘They’ve always been good the lads that work with us, they don’t really break the rules…’  
And so the rules don’t quite get broken, just bent a bit.  Indeed, violation of safety rules emerged as 
such a quotidian aspect of construction site life that their consideration did not even merit detailed 
discussion with regards to any associated danger, accident or incident (Sherratt et al., 2013).  The 
rules are bent and broken on such a regular basis that workers are fully expecting to be punished 
when caught, as this worker explained: 
‘you should be allowed, say, a couple of times, if you haven’t got your gloves on or something 
like that … would you mind putting our gloves on please … then say the second time … 
there’ll be consequences … you can handle that, you know, if it’s done politely’ 
These shared understandings of the safety rules and a ready acceptance of punishment, when done 
‘correctly’, indicate a resignation amongst the site-based workers and supervisors that such ongoing 
interactions around rule breaking and punishment are simply an unavoidable inevitability.  Work 
cannot be done as prescribed without breaking the safety rules as currently enforced, and so the 
rules will be broken, and people will be punished. 
However, within the workforce there is also an understanding of safety as a holistic, integral part of 
construction work.  It is something that goes beyond engagement and enforcement, reflective of the 
complexities of practice and instead bringing safety back into localised and immediate contexts.  As 
one worker surmised: 
‘if he’s not looking after me, and I’m not looking out for him, then we’re not gonna be getting 
anywhere, are we?’ 
Such an understanding clearly supports the potential for workers to self-organise around safety, 
bringing notions of mindfulness and collaboration to the workspace and positioning safety practice 
as a dynamic and responsive process that requires the engagement and involvement of all workers 
to support and maintain the safety of everyone on site. 
Discussion: Is Construction Ready to Become Adaptive? 
Empirical work in the field of complexity has demonstrated the capabilities of people to detect, 
adapt, and correct their systems as necessary (Hovden et al., 2010), and construction people should 
be able to do this, perhaps even more than most.  Construction workers are some of the most 
adaptable and creative in the world, solutions and fixes are part of everyday construction work, and 
the attitude pervades that there is ‘nothing that can’t be done’ (Sherratt, 2016).  The examination of 
the dominant discourses of safety as found on large UK construction sites presented here has been 
able to empirically demonstrate a space in which the safety management approach of situational 
self-organising, as set out in the principles of adaptive safety, has the potential to be adopted. 
Considering Workers and Work 
Construction workers are fully aware of the complexities of safety management in practice as found 
on construction sites.  Indeed, the nature of safety as found within such a technologically and 
socially complex system is perhaps better understood by those on site than those seeking to manage 
safety from more removed positions.  Whilst the corporate voice still speaks of safe/unsafe, site 
workers and supervisors are only all too aware of the fluidity and flexibility that surround safety in 
practice.  Although formal documentation, and supportive legislation, consider safety as relatively 
simple and easily defined within the polarised scope of safe/unsafe, practice has necessarily unbent 
to allow for emergence and change; safety becoming a fluid, flexible and mutable state, also 
necessarily reflecting the variability of a context in which the relationships between time, cost and 
production, or work vs safety and safety vs work, are highly influential.  These various and 
interlinked experiential understandings of safety reflect the theoretical positioning of safety as an 
emergent, diverse and changeable property within a complex system, acknowledged and 
understood in terms of its relationships with practice. 
Workers are also fully aware of the safety, or rather dangers, inherent in construction work, as 
evidenced by their positioning of safety as danger albeit alongside a belittling and derision of the 
consequences of its failure.  However, the latter could be considered an essential characteristic of 
construction workers in and of themselves, as they must necessarily be able to face such danger 
every time they set foot on site (Rawlinson and Farrell, 2009).  The dismissal of danger or its 
reduction to a joke or anecdote is perhaps simply the most straightforward way to create and 
recreate an acceptable workplace reality, for both themselves and their families.  Yet this high risk 
tolerance among the workers could also negatively affect situational self-organising, reliant as it is 
on the shared acceptance of what is safe or unsafe within specific contexts.  Although, as both 
argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically here, what is ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ is never so easily 
defined within the complex and every-changing system of the construction site, and certainly not 
from perspectives of centralised control.  This ‘risk’ can therefore be tempered to some extent by 
both the localisation of such evaluations, experience and context holding influence around the 
situational, but also by the fact that such self-organising decisions are not made alone but with co-
workers.  From this perspective, merit can be found on the construction site with workers accepting 
of the need for their collegiality and shared support of each other in order to ensure the safety of 
everyone on site. 
Indeed, the construction site context is one in which the workers already make sense of safety from 
perspectives more familiar to HROs and Adaptive Safety practitioners, and they have arguably 
reached this point before the construction safety management experts.  Their understandings of 
safety are therefore open to a process of situational self-organising as the workers fully accept that 
construction sites are complex, they are changeable, and safety is never simple.  This is something 
clearly understood by workers as they construct and reconstruct their shared understandings of 
safety in practice through the dominant discourses of the site. 
Considering Management and Control 
Yet the adoption of situational self-organising within the construction workforce would require 
significant organisational change before finding fit within the construction industry.  Although small 
steps have been made in these directions over recent years, for example under the banners of a 
‘making safety personal’ approach to safety culture and various worker engagement mechanisms, 
these are arguably only additions to the command and enforcement structures that remain firmly in 
place on sites (Sherratt et al., 2013).  Safety management approaches remain reductionist and linear 
(Dekker, 2011), and the reliance remains on lagging indicators, KPIs, AFRs, bureaucratic 
measurement (Dekker, 2014) and accident investigation, despite the fact that construction projects 
are complex and non-linear systems, creating a fundamental dissonance with practice.   
Indeed, it could be suggested that the very nature of construction, with its reliance on low-cost 
tendering and fragmented supply chains that already have negative implications for safety 
management (Sherratt, 2016), would make the adoption of such adaptive safety measures 
impossibly challenging.  Subcontracting and work package separation fragments expertise, 
specialisation resulting in a lack of broader experiential knowledge and thereby leaving a project 
vulnerable to unknown unknowns (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014) and unable to adopt adaptive 
safety practices.  Indeed, as Harvey et al. (2016) note, without authority and regulation, worker 
autonomy within this context currently leads to focus on productivity and so unsafe workarounds 
and violations, rather than improvements in safety.  However, this may itself be a consequence of 
the need for the organisational slack required to allow time for reflective decision making and 
continuous organisational learning (Ivory and Alderman, 2005), and physical resources to support 
such adaptive safety approaches (Reiman et al., 2015; Harvey et al., 2016), both of which are all too 
often lacking in construction, where time and money dominate production pressures.   
In addition to the above, the legal and regulatory requirements in place suggest that a significant 
amount of organisational bravery is required to develop the management role from one solely 
focused on command and control to one seeking the creation of positive preconditions for adaptive 
safety in construction, empowering workers to situationally self-organise, and of course to pay for it.  
However, the adoption of situational self-organising does not necessitate the removal of all 
management control or limit wider organisational learning as part of the safety management 
process.  Indeed a key part of the process would be to, where possible, instantiate the local, 
contextual and project specific lessons learnt through situational self-organising into wider 
organisational process.  Such a clearly realised and practiced bottom-up approach, driven by the site 
rather than the office, would arguably be better able to avoid the current friction between the 
discourses of enforcement and engagement that have emerged as a consequence of current 
practice, and able to authentically prioritise engagement over enforcement in practice.  Such site-
generated safety knowledge can augment and develop current guidelines, best practice and even 
construction-specific legislation with due recognisance and acceptance of how safety actually works 
within this specific context. 
Mechanisms for capturing such experiential learning and embedding this in shared practice require 
effective processes of communication and instantiation between site practice and the organisation, 
where such knowledge can be captured and then re-distributed.  However, this has historically 
proved challenging within the construction site context (Mohamed and Anumba 2006), although this 
can be in part linked to organisational motivation.  For example, within the airline industry, where a 
poor safety record is a direct threat to the survival of the airline, the motivation to ensure learning 
from lived experience is high.  Within the construction industry, sanctions are weaker and firms must 
only stay within the prescription of the law, while accidents have less effect on the bottom-line, and 
are even seen as normal.  The business motivations to find the resource necessary to facilitate 
detailed learning are therefore much lower.  To facilitate such learning in construction would require 
the organizational capacity to fully involve site-workers in their own safety management processes 
(including the ability to sanction slack, non-productive time as part of the knowledge transfer 
process) and have the means to capture this learning in changes to manuals and training.  Such an 
approach would make organisational Safety Management Systems much more dynamic, and 
constantly under development through self-organising and subsequent organizational learning 
processes.  Furthermore, the investment of time and resources to develop and facilitate such a 
process would provide the opportunity for the organisation to demonstrate a commercial 
commitment to safety readily recognisable from client perspectives, thus providing a potential 
competitive advantage in some circumstances.   
  
Conclusions 
The complex nature of the construction industry, both technologically and socially, means it is 
eminently suitable for both the unpacking of its processes from complexity-theory perspectives.  A 
strong sense of purpose is needed for a system to self-organise effectively (Reiman et al., 2015), but 
construction has just that: working to drawings and specifications through agreed sequencing as 
defined by technologies, which lead to a tangible, finished product.  It also has a workforce able to 
invent and innovate with regards to such technologically complex work, therefore why not also 
apply such innovation to safety? 
Here, we have empirically demonstrated the nuanced realities of this site context, as a space in 
which safety is a fluid, dynamic and emergent aspect of work, something the workers perhaps 
appreciate far more readily as part of their lived experiences than those who make the ‘safety rules’ 
offsite.  In this way, we have provided evidence that supports the development of just one aspect of 
adaptive safety, that of situational self-organising, as an appropriate development for safety 
management on construction sites.  We have argued for its inclusion as a supplemental aspect of 
existing site SMSs, able to bring a dynamism and ground-up engagement with safety that is currently 
lacking, supporting organisational development in a positive and demonstrable way.  This will need 
organisational commitment in terms of resources for support, and a measure of organisational 
bravery to actually ‘hand-over’ control to the workers, but this is a step that can be justified by those 
seeking to overcome the plateauing of safety management within the industry, and who genuinely 
wish to further reduce accidents and incidents on sites.  
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